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Identifying and communicating uncertainty is core to effective environmental
assessment (EA). This study evaluates the extent to which uncertainties are considered
and addressed in Canadian EA practice. We reviewed the environmental protection
plans, follow-up programs, and panel reports (where applicable) of 12 EAs between
1995 and 2012. The types of uncertainties and levels of disclosure varied greatly.
When uncertainties were acknowledged, practitioners adopted five different
approaches to address them. However, uncertainties were never discussed or
addressed in depth. We found a lack of suitable terminology and consistency in how
uncertainties are disclosed, reflecting the need for explicit guidance, and we present
recommendations for improvement. Canadian Environmental Impact Statements are
not as transparent with respect to uncertainties as they should be, and uncertainties in
EA need to be better considered and communicated.
Keywords: uncertainty; communication; disclosure; environmental assessment (EA);
prediction; environmental protection plans (EPPs); follow-up; transparency
1. Introduction
The rationale for environmental assessment (EA) is to provide decision makers and
stakeholders with a complete understanding of a proposed project, including its potential
impacts and strategies to effectively manage those impacts. However, because EA is
designed as a process to identify and manage future outcomes, uncertainties are
unavoidable (Duncan 2008). Uncertainty in EA is due, in part, to complexities in the
design and operation of large development projects (Noble and Storey 2005), and to
the inherent complexity of environmental systems (Berg and Scheringer 1994)  such as
the large number of potentially important components and interrelationships to be
considered when assessing impacts, or time lags in their response (Jaeger 1998; Findlay
and Bourdages 2000). Since there will always be knowledge gaps and uncertainty in EA
(Arts, Caldwell, and Morrison-Saunders 2001), the problem is whether and how
uncertainty information is communicated and how uncertainties are addressed in EA
(Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad 2006; Duncan 2008; Leung et al. 2015).
Previous research has shown that uncertainties in EA often are not given sufficient
attention (Wood 2008; Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad 2006). Several scholars have thus
urged for better consideration of uncertainties in EA since, arguably, the cost of restoring
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unintended impacts is much greater than the cost of preventative measures (Wardekker
et al. 2008). Uncertainty disclosure in EA promotes greater consideration and
communication of the potential risks associated with a proposed development project,
helps ensure the accountability of the proponent and decision makers, and promotes
transparency and openness throughout the project evaluation process (Tennøy, Kværner,
and Gjerstad 2006; Wardekker et al. 2008). However, notwithstanding consistent
messages about the need for better consideration and disclosure of uncertainties in EA
(e.g., De Jongh 1988; Wood, Dipper, and Jones 2000; Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad
2006; Wood 2008; Leung et al. 2015), how uncertainties are considered and disclosed in
EA practice has received little to no attention. There is a need to understand the practice
of how uncertainties are considered in EA, and the procedures in place to deal with them,
before current uncertainty communication practices may be improved. This need may
become more urgent in the future as a result of increasing pressures for resource
development and demands for more rapid assessment and project approvals (Gibson
2012; Bond et al. 2014), potentially based on limited environmental baseline data and
correspondingly greater uncertainties.
This study examines the extent to which uncertainty is considered and addressed in
Canadian EA practice. The purpose is to identify potential trends and good practices in
order to help future EA practitioners and decision makers to better consider and disclose
uncertainty. We focus our attention on Environmental Protection Plans (EPPs) and
follow-up programs, as reported in project Environmental Impact Statements (EISs), and
the reports of project review panels (where applicable). Our objectives are to identify
what kinds of uncertainties are expressed in EPPs, follow-up programs, and panel reports
and to examine whether and how the uncertainties identified are being addressed. In the
sections that follow, we first present our study design, including the sample of EAs and
our approach to identifying and classifying uncertainties. Results are then presented
showing how uncertainty was disclosed in the EAs and, when disclosed, how uncertainty
was addressed. This is followed by a discussion of the results and implications and
recommendations for uncertainty disclosure in EA practice.
2. Methods
Our methods consisted of sampling comprehensive study and review panel EAs;
identification of uncertainties in EA documentation; and categorization of uncertainty
disclosure practices. Comprehensive study EAs are in-depth assessments, usually reserved
for large-scale projects having the potential for significant adverse environmental effects.
Projects that are particularly complex, with the potential for greater uncertainties or public
concerns, may be referred to a review panel. Under both types of assessment, a project
proponent is responsible for preparing an EIS. The EISs are presented to decision makers
and the public as part of the regulatory-based EA process to communicate about a
project’s potential impacts and proposed mitigation. Under a review panel assessment,
there is further inquiry by an independent panel that may commission additional studies
and hold public hearing processes. Our analysis focused on the EISs prepared by project
proponents, particularly the follow-up programs and EPPs developed as part of those
EISs, and, in the case of review panel EAs, also the final reports of the review panels.
2.1. Selection of environmental assessments
Twelve Canadian federal (or joint federal-provincial) EAs were selected for analysis.
Only EAs completed since proclamation of the 1995 Canadian Environmental






























Assessment Act and before the proclamation of the 2012 Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act were included. Attention focused on EAs for large infrastructure or
resource extraction projects. Completed comprehensive study and review panel EAs were
initially identified on the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency’s (CEAA)
website, and full documentation was accessed either through a particular government
agency’s website, or by contacting a specific government agency or project proponent.
The EA selection was stratified according to: the type of EA (comprehensive study or
review panel), location (provinces or territories), and development sector. The intent was
to sample as diversely as possible. The EAs covered 14 development sectors, including
mining, road construction, gas facilities, flood control, storage facilities, treatment
centers, pipelines, power lines, nuclear facilities, decommissioning, decontamination and
remediation projects, groundwater collector wells, hydroelectricity, offshore oil and gas
development, port and marine development, and ski development. The number of
completed comprehensive study EAs was higher than the number of review panels, and
EAs were unevenly distributed across the provinces and territories. This was because, for
example, no review panel or comprehensive study EA reports were available for either
the Yukon or Nunavut. Also, no information on review panel EAs was available for
Manitoba. For Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island, EAs were identified but
documentation could not be obtained. Where the geographic distribution of attainable
EAs was more condensed, more were selected for inclusion in the study (Table 1).
The process of obtaining EA documentation was difficult, even though EISs and
review panel reports are, in principle, public documents. Similar challenges to obtaining
EA reports were experienced by Ball, Noble, and Dube (2013), who reported missing or
incomplete assessments in their study of EA in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Accessing
comprehensive study EA reports was particularly problematic, and we were often
directed to reviews or summaries versus being provided with the comprehensive study
report itself. The availability of EA documentation is an important issue because learning
from past experience, and using that knowledge to better manage uncertainties in future
assessments, is only possible if information about past projects is accessible. Otherwise,
past mistakes may be repeated, knowledge gaps will persist, and many uncertainties may
remain unaddressed.
2.2. Identification of uncertainties
Extracting uncertainty information from the EISs and panel reports was based on content
analysis  a systematic approach to the gathering of unstructured information into
specific and predetermined categories (Krippendorff 2004). Qualitative content analysis
addresses the form of the information collected, while quantitative analysis records the
incidences of the form of the information collected (Smith 1975). For our reviews of
EISs, attention focused on the proponent’s EPPs (i.e., mitigation measures and
contingency plans to deal with potential impacts) and follow-up programs (i.e.,
monitoring, adaptive management, and auditing plans) since, arguably, these are the
components of a project assessment that should be designed to account for uncertainties
in impact prediction, in project design, in environment and socioeconomic system
response, and in the effectiveness of any proposed mitigation measures (Noble 2015).
Uncertainty information was extracted from the EPPs and follow-up programs for
each EIS, and from the review panel reports where applicable, by applying a series of
review questions (Table 2) that were developed based on previous approaches to EIS
reviews by Burris and Canter (1997) and S€oderman (2005). Not all questions were
answered for each EIS  as when uncertainty was not disclosed in the documents some






























Table 1. Sample of projects and environmental assessment documentation included in our
analysis.
Project EIS documentation
Joslyn North Mine Project,
Alberta1
Deer Creek Energy Limited 2006. Section B Project Description
and Section D Environmental Assessment; Total E&P Joslyn




Taseko Mines Limited 2009. Prosperity Gold-Copper Project
Environmental Impact Statement/Application; Taseko Mines
Limited 2010. Prosperity Gold-Copper Mine Project  Report





Nalcor Energy 2011. Lower Churchill Hydroelectric Generation
ProjectReport of the Joint Review Panel; Nalcor Energy
2013. Lower Churchill Project  Project Wide Environmental
Protection Plan Component 1 and 4b
Mackenzie Gas Pipeline,
Northwest Territories1
Imperial Oil Resources Ventures Limited, ConocoPhillips, Shell,
ExxonMobil and Aboriginal Pipeline Group 2004.
Environmental Impact Statement for the Mackenzie Gas
Project; Joint Review Panel appointed to review the
environmental impacts of the proposed Mackenzie Gas Project
2009. Report of the Joint Review Panel for The Mackenzie Gas
Project
Marmot Basin Ski Development,
Alberta2
Iris Environmental Systems 1999. A Proposal to Develop a
Chairlift and Ski Runs on Eagle Ridge Marmot Basin Ski Area,
Jasper National Park
Prince George Hart Water
Supply, British Columbia2
Golder Associates 2003. Application for Environmental
Assessment Certificate and Draft Comprehensive Study Report
for the City of Prince George Island Collector Well
Swan Valley Gasification
Project, Manitoba2
Golder Associates 2000. Environmental Impact Assessment for
the Swan Valley Gasification Project
Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal
and Multi-Purpose Pier, New
Brunswick2
Jacques Whitford Environment Limited 2004. Environmental
Impact Statement Liquefied Natural Gas Marine Terminal and
Multi-Purpose Pier
Deep Panuke Offshore Oil
Development, Nova Scotia2
EnCana Energy Corporation 2006. Deep Panuke Offshore Gas
Development Plan-EIS; EnCana Energy Corporation. 2002.





Ministry of Transportation 2009. 407 East Individual
Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Design Study;
CEAA 2011. 407 East Transportation Corridor 
Comprehensive Study Report
Aquarius Gold Mine, Ontario2 AGRA Earth and Environmental Limited 1999. Comprehensive
Study Report Environmental Assessment, Aquarius Project
Waskaganish Permanent Road
Development, Quebec2
INRS (Institut national de la recherche scientifique) 1998. The
Crees of The Waskaganish First Nation. Waskaganish
Permanent Road Environmental and Social Impact Study,
Volume I - Impact Analysis
1Review panel assessment.
2Comprehensive study assessment.






























questions could not be addressed. For example, in the Prosperity Gold-Copper Project EIS
the follow-up program raised the issue of uncertainty about human impacts on Grizzly
Bear mortality. Review question number four (see Table 2) was therefore applicable in
this case, to assess how uncertainty was addressed by the proposed follow-up program
measures. However, the ‘Grizzly Bear Mortality Investigation Program’ is not described
in detail: only a summary is provided.
2.3. Categorization of uncertainty disclosure practices
Different types of uncertainty can be distinguished, some of which may be possible to
quantify (e.g., Benetto, Dujet, and Rousseaux 2006, Peche and Rodriguez 2011, Ross,
Booker, and Montoya 2013), while other types are not due to lack of knowledge about
the components and structure of the environmental or socioeconomic systems affected
(Duncan 2013; Bond et al. 2015). For each environmental component (e.g., air, water,
soils, wildlife) identified in each EIS, specific uncertainties in mitigation, contingency
plans, and follow-up programs were then categorized based on: (1) what the uncertainty
was generally about; (2) the nature and level of uncertainty disclosure; and (3) how the
uncertainty was addressed. The same categorization was applied to uncertainties
identified in review panel reports, where applicable, for panel review EAs.
The first category of uncertainty, what the uncertainty was about, identifies the
specific focus of uncertainty. In mitigation or follow-up, for example, this may include
uncertainty about cumulative impacts, residual impacts, or the effectiveness of mitigation
Table 2. Review questions used to gather uncertainty information from environmental protection
plans, follow-up programs, and review panel reports.
1. Do mitigation/follow-up/contingency plans directly disclose/address uncertainty?
What is the uncertainty about? (e.g., predictions, mitigation, project design, etc.)
What types of uncertainty are identified? (e.g., model uncertainties, data uncertainties, etc.)
2. Is uncertainty used as a criterion when addressing the significance of residual impacts?
3. When identified, how is uncertainty addressed?
 Is uncertainty justified or ignored?
 Is uncertainty addressed by more research?
 Is uncertainty explored through risk-based scenarios, worst-case scenarios, or probabilities?
 Is uncertainty mitigated?
 Is uncertainty addressed through adaptive management measures?
4. When follow-up or adaptive management measures are proposed to address uncertainties, are the
program details disclosed? (e.g., schedule, budget, authority, management thresholds, monitoring
design)
5. Are uncertainties identified in the proponent’s EPP or follow-up program further discussed or
addressed in review panel reports?
6. Are new uncertainties identified or discussed in review panel reports that were not identified or
disclosed in the proponent’s EPP or follow-up program?
7. When uncertainty is identified in review panel reports, how is it addressed?
 Is uncertainty justified or ignored?
 Is uncertainty addressed by more research?
 Is uncertainty explored through risk-based scenarios, worst-case scenarios, or probabilities?
 Is uncertainty mitigated?
 Is uncertainty addressed through adaptive management measures?






























measures. In contingency plans, uncertainty may be about the risk of a failure, or about
the effectiveness of the contingency plans. The second category, the nature and level of
uncertainty disclosure, refers to how uncertainty is communicated or discussed in the EIS
or panel report. Our classification of the nature and level of uncertainty disclosure was
based largely on Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad’s (2006) analysis of uncertainty in EA
impact predictions in Denmark, and drawing also on uncertainty classifications found
elsewhere in the literature (e.g., De Jongh 1988; Walker et al. 2003). We categorized
uncertainty disclosure from no disclosure to low to high disclosure, and whether the
disclosure was explicit or implicit in nature (Table 3).
For example, the Prosperity Gold-Copper Project EIS states, regarding direct
mortality for grizzly bear: “actual baseline poaching incidence is unknown” (Taseko
Mines Limited 2009, Vol. 5, Sect. 6, 128); there is “no local information on incidence of
grizzly bear road kills” (Taseko Mines Limited 2009, Vol. 5, Sect. 6, 128); and “there is
no baseline (mortality) data” (Taseko Mines Limited 2009, Vol. 5, Sect. 6, 261). In this
case, the uncertainty disclosure could be categorized as implicit based on use of the terms
‘unknown’, ‘no local information’, and ‘no baseline (mortality) data’. Further, the
uncertainty was explained to some degree; enough that it could be determined as both
stochastic (due to the variability in environmental, societal, and technological processes)
and epistemic (due to the imperfection of our understanding of processes). As such, it was
classified as a medium level of disclosure.
The third component, how the uncertainty was addressed, refers to the actions taken
by the proponent or review panel, or recommended actions, to deal with uncertainty in
those cases where uncertainty was disclosed. Again, taking the Prosperity Gold-Copper
case as an example, in the review panel report, uncertainty about the project’s effects on
grizzly bears was justified by the localized nature of the project’s predicted impacts. The
panel noted that: “there was some uncertainty about the Project’s effects on grizzly
bears” (Taseko Mines Ltd. 2010, 225), but that “at a broader regional scale, the total
affected area would be relatively small” (Taseko Mines Ltd. 2010, 225), and “while that
… grizzly population is nearing the endangered level, the population of grizzly bears at
Table 3. Classification system used to describe the extent to which uncertainty is expressed in
environmental protection plans, follow-up programs, and review panel reports.
Level of
disclosure Content Description
None n/a Uncertainty is not disclosed (neither suggested nor mentioned), neither directly
nor indirectly.
Low Implicit Uncertainty is suggested implicitly and not specifically referred to as
uncertainty. It is not explained or discussed, and the type of uncertainty is
not identifiable.
Explicit Uncertainty is suggested explicitly and referred to as uncertainty but not
explained or discussed. The type of uncertainty is not identifiable.
Medium Implicit Uncertainty is explained and/or discussed to some degree, but not referred to as
uncertainty.
Explicit Uncertainty is explained and/or discussed explicitly to some degree, and
referred to as uncertainty.
High Implicit Uncertainty is explained and discussed in depth, but not referred to as
uncertainty.
Explicit Uncertainty is explained and discussed in depth, and referred to as uncertainty.
Source: Adapted, based on Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad (2006).






























the provincial level is more stable” (Taseko Mines Ltd. 2010, 225); and “consequently,
the Panel finds that the overall effects on biodiversity due to a possible further reduction
in the … grizzly bear population would not be considered significant” (Taseko Mines
Ltd. 2010, 225). Thus, while uncertainty was raised, the panel justified not dealing with
the uncertainty and no specific action was recommended to address it. Similar kinds of
actions were grouped until several common responses to addressing uncertainty emerged
from the content analysis.
3. Results
3.1. How uncertainty was disclosed
Table 4 summarizes the total number of times uncertainties were expressed in the EPPs
and follow-up sections of the EISs and in the panel reports; the number of uncertainties
with a low or medium level of disclosure; and the number of uncertainties disclosed
according to what they were generally about (i.e., impact predictions, cumulative
impacts, residual impacts, mitigation measures, and follow-up programs). There was no
high disclosure found in any report.
Uncertainties disclosed about initial impact predictions (prior to mitigation) were the
most common disclosures, followed by uncertainties about the effectiveness of the
prescribed mitigation measures, uncertainties about the probability and significance of
residual impacts, and uncertainties about potential cumulative impacts (Table 4). Overall,
we found that uncertainties about follow-up programs were rarely mentioned in the EIS,
aside from the Lower Churchill Hydroelectric Generation Project. Three reports (Prince
George Hart Water Supply Project, Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal and Multi-Purpose
Pier, and Waskaganish Permanent Road) did not disclose any uncertainties. Not
surprisingly, more uncertainties were disclosed in review panel assessments than
comprehensive studies  by their nature, review panel EAs are triggered due to the
complex and often uncertain nature of a proposed project and involve further scrutiny of
impact predictions and, potentially, related uncertainties. Review panel EAs also provide
for additional rounds of public input and review, and the opportunity for further
discussion and debate of uncertainties. We observed that review panels often
acknowledged the general complexity and unpredictability of environmental processes
more so than project proponents did in their EISs; however, we also found that specific
uncertainties were never discussed in depth nor explained by review panels.
We also found inconsistencies with respect to how uncertainty was disclosed
(Table 4). Uncertainty disclosure was either not done or was classified as low or medium
in all EAs, including both EIS documentation and panel review reports. Uncertainties
were sometimes identifiable, but it was often not clear what the uncertainty was about.
When uncertainties were identifiable, they were mainly about data, context, and model
uncertainties  including stochastic and epistemic uncertainties. In some cases
uncertainty was taken into account, to some extent, through contingency scenarios, but
these were never discussed and addressed in depth in the EIS documentation. When
uncertainties were mentioned (either explicitly or suggested implicitly), they were never
explored using worst-case outcomes, or using risk or probability assessments.
Terminology used for reporting uncertainty varied considerably. In all reports,
expressions such as ‘may’, ‘could’, ‘probably’, ‘maybe’, or ‘as soon as possible’ were
commonly used where uncertainty was not disclosed, but may have indeed been present
(Table 5). For example, the Joslyn North Mine EIS (Deer Creek Energy Limited 2006,
1030) identifies “follow-up monitoring that could be done to ensure the long-term





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sustainability of the soils resource”, and in the Marmot Ski Area EIS, with regard to past
baseline conditions and forest age, reports that “low elevation forests were probably not
old aged” (Iris Environmental Systems 1999, D.10, 30). No uncertainty was actually
disclosed in these two examples, and no particular type of uncertainty was identified such
that it could be appropriately managed. These kinds of expressions (Table 5) were
extensively used in all EA documentation, but without qualification, and they suggest
vagueness and imprecision about impacts, mitigation, contingencies, and follow-up
programs. When these expressions were used, it was not possible to determine whether
the EA was intending to disclose or hide a gap in knowledge. The use of such vague and
imprecise terminology has been reported elsewhere as a persistent problem in Canadian
EA practice (Noble and Storey 2005).
In those instances where uncertainty was implicitly disclosed, disclosure was either low
or medium. Low and implicit disclosure implies that uncertainty was suggested, but not
explicitly identified, explained, or discussed. The type of uncertainty was not identifiable.
Medium and implicit disclosure implies that uncertainty was explained to some degree but
not referred to as uncertainty. The type of uncertainty, such as data uncertainty for
example, was identifiable. In the contingency planning sections of the EISs reviewed,
uncertainty was always implicitly taken into account simply by way of definition, and
purpose, of contingency planning. Table 6 provides examples of the terminology often used
for the implicit disclosure of uncertainties in the EIS’s mitigation measures and follow-up
programs. In most instances, disclosure was considered low and the source or type of
uncertainty was not identifiable. In the Swan Valley Gasification Project EIS, for example,
reference is simply made to “unexpected conditions” (Golder Associates 2000, 154), but
with no further explanation, when referring to the possibility of control or mitigation
failures during pipeline construction. In contrast, the Prosperity Gold-Copper Project EIS
implicitly disclosed uncertainties associated with impacts to groundwater, referring to
“confidence in the project’s effects assessment” (Taseko Mines Limited 2009, Vol. 4,
Sect. 4, 138), and then qualifying the level of confidence based on reasoned argumentation.
The source of uncertainty was easily identifiable and could be associated with a particular
cause  in this case impact prediction and context and stochastic uncertainty.
Table 5. Common terminology identified from the sample of 12 EAs where uncertainty was not
disclosed or suggested, but where vague or imprecise wording suggest a gap in knowledge or non-
commitment about a particular impact prediction or prescribed mitigation action.
Might/may  Could/can  Likely/unlikely  Potential/potentially
 Probably  Improbable  Relatively  Approximately
 Assumed  As needed  To the extent possible Where/when possible




Where appropriate Where economically
feasible
Table 6. Common terminology identified from the sample of 12 EAs where uncertainty was
implicit  uncertainty was suggested but not explored or specifically referred to as uncertainty.
 Unplanned  Unknown  Data gaps  Confidence in prediction
 Unexpected  Knowledge deficiencies Moderate reliability  Unreliable
 Unpredictability  Accuracy






























There were also examples of explicit disclosure of uncertainties  where uncertainty
was explicitly identified but not explained or discussed, or where uncertainty was
explained or discussed and referred to as uncertainty. There were more examples of
explicit than implicit disclosure. The review panel report for the Joslyn North Mine, for
example, notes regulator concerns about the “uncertainty of the predictive models” and
that, based on the limited data and assumptions, it is not possible to “predict with certainty
the success of fish habitat compensation” (Total E&P Joslyn Ltd. 2011, 65). In this case,
uncertainty was about impact prediction and mitigation effectiveness, and the source of the
uncertainty was identifiable  data, modeling, and recognized stochastic uncertainty.
Similar examples of explicit disclosure were found in the Prosperity Gold-Copper Project
EIS, Mackenzie Gas Project panel report, and the 407 East Transportation Corridor project.
3.2. When disclosed, how uncertainty was addressed
Uncertainty was often discussed only in a general way by project proponents in their EPPs
and follow-up programs, and by review panels in their panel reports. Review panel reports
in particular often acknowledged uncertainty, but then stated that uncertainty should be
addressed with follow-up programs and/or precautionary measures, yet provided few
recommendations or limited direction for addressing specific uncertainties. In the
Mackenzie Gas Project, for example, the review panel’s report focused on uncertainty,
emphasizing “…the implications of uncertainties for decision making are explicitly
considered; and greater emphasis on monitoring and adaptive management is required”
(Joint Review Panel appointed to review the environmental impacts of the proposed
Mackenzie Gas Project 2009, 95). The panel recommended adaptive management
strategies due, in part, to the proponent’s “heavy reliance on their proposed monitoring
programs … when the monitoring programs themselves were ill-defined…” (Joint Review
Panel appointed to review the environmental impacts of the proposed Mackenzie Gas
Project 2009, 96), but no specific uncertainties were identified by the review panel and no
specific direction provided for adaptive management to address the uncertainty.
In all 12 EISs, commitments were made in follow-up programs that further
information would be gathered through monitoring, post-project approval; however, in
almost all cases it was not possible to determine the specific uncertainties identified in the
EIS, if any, that follow-up was intended to address. The details of follow-up programs
were not discussed  specifically the schedule or timing of implementation, the authority
to implement or manage, and management thresholds. Commenting on the Joslyn North
Mine fish and fish habitat assessment, the review panel expressed concerns about the
uncertainty of predictive models, predictive accuracy, and the success of habitat
compensation measures, noting that conditions would be required as part of the project
authorization, including the use of adaptive management to address uncertainty (Total
E&P Joslyn Ltd. 2011, 65), but no details were provided on the means to validate
predictions and outcomes to resolve uncertainties.
Aside from general discussions of uncertainties and broad-brush recommendations
about the need for follow-up programs or adaptive management, when uncertainty was
disclosed, either implicitly or explicitly, several approaches could be identified to address
that uncertainty (Table 7). In any single EA, multiple approaches were often identified
and sometimes used in combination and, as such, the number of uncertainties presented
in Table 7 does not reflect the total number of incidences where uncertainties were
disclosed. When uncertainty was discussed only in a general way, no uncertainties were
clearly identifiable, and thus not reported in the table. Uncertainties addressed only by





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































broad recommendations for follow-up or adaptive management were also not considered
in the table. No uncertainties were disclosed in the Prince George Hart Water Supply
Project, the Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal and Multi-Purpose Pier, and the
Waskaganish Permanent Road project.
3.2.1. Uncertainty not addressed, or uncertainty levels estimated but then ignored
Most uncertainties disclosed remained unaddressed  including those cases where
qualitative estimates of the levels of uncertainty were provided. For example, in the
Joslyn North Mine EIS the levels of confidence in impact predictions were noted,
sometimes assigning a ‘level of confidence’ (e.g., low, moderate, high) or ‘level of
scientific uncertainty’, but often no information was provided on how these levels were
defined. For those impacts where the level of confidence was defined, there was no
discussion of what was to be done to reduce the uncertainty or whether it played a
significant role in any subsequent management actions. Further, in many cases, after
identifying specific knowledge gaps in a table in the EIS, uncertainty due to such
knowledge gaps was subsequently ignored in any further impact analysis or discussion
about mitigation. Similar practices were found in the Prosperity Gold-Copper Mine (for
vegetation and wetland ecosystems), the Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal Project, and the
Deep Panuke Offshore Gas Project.
3.2.2. Uncertainty not addressed, but this was either justified or hidden
A second approach was to justify the neglect of uncertainty treatment based on the
abundance or resilience of the affected component, or the small size or footprint of the
project. In the Aquarius Gold Mine EIS, for example, the wetland resilience was
expected to compensate for any uncertainties associated with the possible failure of
mitigation measures, reporting that “no environmental effects are anticipated in the event
of restoration failure… as natural succession would continue, with the result that wetland
habitats will develop on their own, but simply over a greater time period” (AGRA Earth
and Environmental Limited 1999, 487).
In the Marmot Basin EIS, uncertainty reported in baseline conditions was deemed
unimportant in terms of understanding the significance of the project’s impacts because
of the small size of the project relative to the ‘regional environment’. Concern about the
loss of old-growth forest was explicitly recognized, and the EIS reports that tree age
measurements were not undertaken in the study area (Iris Environmental Systems 1999,
266) and that nearby tree age and stand structure may not reflect conditions in the project
area (Iris Environmental Systems 1999, 268). However, the EIS argued that the tree
species of concern is “abundant and widely distributed” elsewhere and “the removal of a
small number of these tree species … within a confined area is not anticipated to have
anything more than a localized impact” (Iris Environmental Systems 1999, 268). The
compounding effects of any uncertainties in data and baseline conditions, when
considering potential future disturbances to forests in the region due to other projects,
were not considered.
3.2.3. Uncertainty was to be addressed with precautionary approaches
The precautionary principle or a precautionary approach was sometimes recommended to
address uncertainty. The most elaborated example we found was the assessment of the
effects of subsidence due to natural gas reservoir depletion in the Mackenzie Gas Project.






























The EIS reported “there is a relatively high degree of confidence that effects will be less
than predicted because where data is uncertain, the precautionary principle has been
applied in developing the effects assessment” (Imperial Oil Resources Ventures
ConocoPhillips, Shell, ExxonMobil and Aboriginal Pipeline Group 2004, Vol. 5, Sect. 7,
186). However, aside from indicating that a precautionary principle was applied “to
ensure that the EIS does not under-report potential effects” (Imperial Oil Resources
Ventures, ConocoPhillips, Shell, ExxonMobil and Aboriginal Pipeline Group 2004, Vol.
5, Sect. 7, 186), no details were provided. The definition of a precautionary approach was
briefly explained, based on Government of Canada (2001), and two short examples of
how this approach can be applied were then provided. The EIS then gives assurance that
“In response to uncertainties in the prediction of project effects, programs will be
established … to monitor effects and to provide a basis for adjusting environmental
management actions” (Imperial Oil Resources Ventures, ConocoPhillips, Shell,
ExxonMobil and Aboriginal Pipeline Group 2004, Vol. 5, Sect. 7, 187), but these
programs were not discussed in the EIS. Three other EAs also recommended some form
of precautionary approach to address uncertainties, but provided even less detail or
explanation: Joslyn North Mine, for the establishment of wildlife corridors; Lower
Churchill Hydroelectric Generation Project, for potential ecological and mercury effects
downstream; Swan Valley Gasification, for potentially unstable soils.
3.2.4. Uncertainties were addressed with the use of conservative estimates or sensitivity
analysis
Conservative estimates or sensitivity analysis were more often used to address
uncertainties than precautionary approaches. The use of conservative estimates allowed
the assessor not to consider uncertainty any further, as there was a high degree of
confidence that an effect was overestimated. This was the case in the Prosperity Gold-
Copper Project EIS where the emission rates for particulate matter used in modeling
“were estimated based on a combination of emission factors” and “there is a high degree
of confidence that emissions are being over-estimated” (Taseko Mines Limited 2009,
Vol. 4, Sect. 2, 48). The EIS goes on to report: “As such, the rating of prediction
confidence is high for the Project based on quality of baseline data, emissions data, and
confidence in the conservative nature of analytical techniques applied in this assessment”
(Taseko Mines Limited 2009, Vol. 4, Sect. 2, 48). For effects to groundwater, the
difficulty in accurately predicting changes in flows was addressed by using sensitivity
analyses to evaluate variability in model responses. It was subsequently concluded that,
“based on the results of the sensitivity analyses, confidence is medium to high that a
conservative assessment … has been considered in the environmental assessment”
(Taseko Mines Limited 2009, Vol. 4, Sect. 2, 139).
Conservative estimates were also used in the Mackenzie Gas Project to address
uncertainties about air quality impact predictions. Confidence that impacts will be less
than predicted was rated high because conservative estimates were used to address data
and model uncertainties. For greenhouse gas emissions, for example, the EIS reports that
the “…prediction confidence in the effects related to greenhouse gas emissions is high
because the likely emissions will be less than predicted. The potential contribution of the
project to greenhouse gas emissions was calculated based on peak operations, with all
equipment operating at full capacity” (Imperial Oil Resources Ventures, ConocoPhillips,
Shell, ExxonMbil and Aboriginal Pipeline Group 2004, Vol. 5, Part A, Sect. 2, 107).
Similar approaches, using sensitivity analyses and conservative approaches, were found
in the Joslyn North Mine Project and the Aquarius Gold Mine Project.






























3.2.5. Uncertainties were addressed by proposing additional research
In four EAs, the approach to addressing reported uncertainties was a proposal for additional
research. This approach was specifically used in review panel EAs, where the panel
acknowledged uncertainty and recommended more research to compensate for the
proponent’s absence of data about a particular impact or about the effectiveness of a
particular mitigation measure. However, the specific nature of the recommended, additional
research was not disclosed in the review panel reports. For example, in the Joslyn North
Mine Project, the panel identified uncertainty regarding mitigation and monitoring with
respect to wildlife corridor establishment (Total E&P Joslyn Ltd. 2011, 45), and then
concluded: “…more studies of the local study area and the regional study area are needed
before a final conclusion can be drawn” (Total E&P Joslyn Ltd. 2011, 45). There were no
clear commitments or directions to the project proponent on what research was needed to
address the uncertainty before the start of the proposed project. Similar approaches to
addressing uncertainty, and challenges, were identified in the Lower Churchill
Hydroelectric Generation Project, and the 407 East Transportation Corridor Project.
4. Discussion
4.1. Uncertainty disclosure
There has been much written on the need to better communicate uncertainties in EA
practice and the implications of non-disclosure (Duncan 2013; Wardekker et al. 2008).
Yet, given the hundreds of impact predictions and mitigation measures identified across
the 12 EAs in our sample, our results reflect the findings of Tennøy, Kværner, and
Gjerstad (2006) and Wiklund (2011) in that uncertainties are not fully disclosed in EA
practice and EA documents often portray a degree of confidence that may not exist.
Context, input and model uncertainties were the types of uncertainty most often
disclosed; however, these uncertainties were never discussed in depth in any of the EAs.
We found only limited consideration of bias uncertainties, uncertainties due to changes in
project design, or statistical uncertainties. Uncertainties about impact predictions were
the most frequently identified across the sample of EAs (89 identified cases).
Uncertainties about impact mitigation measures were disclosed in only half of the EAs
examined, with a total of 27 identified disclosures. Uncertainties associated with
cumulative impacts and residual impacts were less often disclosed. Cumulative impacts
uncertainties were discussed in only three of the reports (15 noted uncertainties), while
uncertainties associated with residual impacts were discussed in only four of the reports
(18 noted uncertainties). The precautionary principle was sometimes referred to, but
applied only in exceptional cases and, when applied, without detailed information about
how it was applied. For example, none of the EAs mentioned a shift in the burden of proof
(i.e., that those responsible for an activity must vouch for its harmlessness and be held
responsible if damage occurs), as required by the Wingspread Statement on the
Precautionary Principle (Ashford et al. 1998).
Our results also indicate that the EA reports lacked consistency regarding
uncertainty disclosure, with no standard practice, procedure, or terminology. No clear
patterns could be identified. Low or medium levels of disclosure were identified
throughout any single EA, and among the various EAs  sometimes uncertainties were
clearly identified and addressed and in other cases uncertainties were noted but it was
not clear what the uncertainty was about. This was also the case regarding explicit and
implicit disclosures  sometimes uncertainty was only suggested or implicit, and in
other instances uncertainty was expressed explicitly. The term ‘confidence’ was used






























often to describe uncertainty in half of the EAs, but in any single EA confidence levels
were not clearly defined and there was variation in how uncertainty was expressed.
This inconsistency in uncertainty disclosure may be a reflection of the lack of
standard, good-practice guidance for reporting, and subsequently addressing uncertainties
in EA practice (Leung et al. 2015). This was evident by the widespread, and inconsistent,
use of vague and unqualified terminology such as ‘may’, ‘could’, ‘probably’, ‘maybe’, or
‘as soon as possible’. Implicit disclosure and the use of such vague terminology not only
makes uncertainty classifications presented in the academic literature (e.g., Tennøy,
Kværner, and Gjerstad 2006; Walker et al. 2003; De Jongh 1988) difficult to apply, if not
impractical, it also poses challenges to regulatory decision makers in trying to identify
whether and where uncertainty exists and how significant these uncertainties are with
respect to a project’s approval or approval conditions. Consistent with Larsen, Kørnøv,
and Driscoll (2013) and Petersen et al. (2011), we suggest there is a need for improved
understanding of, consistency among, and transparency of uncertainty reporting practices
by those involved in the EA process. The Committee on Decision Making Under
Uncertainty (2013), for example, suggests that to successfully communicate uncertainty
there is a need to develop communication plans and strategies that are sensitive to the
needs of stakeholders and decision makers  in this case affected communities and
regulatory agencies.
4.2. Good and poor practices
The highest level of disclosure found in the proponent’s EPPs and follow-up programs
was medium (see Table 3)  uncertainty was identified and explained, and discussed to
some degree, but never fully addressed. Some relatively good practices were identified
from our analysis: in some cases, for example, predicted impacts were assigned a ‘level
of confidence’ or a ‘level of certainty’; in other cases uncertainties were acknowledged
and discussed in separate sections for each environmental receptor. Tables were used in
four of the EAs for assigning a level of confidence or certainty (Joslyn North Mine,
Prosperity Gold-Copper Mine, Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal, Deep Panuke Offshore
Oil Development); however, it often received no further attention in the EA. In only 3 of
the 12 EAs more detailed attention was given to uncertainty, addressing it in a separate
section of EIS documentation (Aquarius Gold Mine, Mackenzie Gas Project, Prosperity
Gold-Copper Mine). However, aside from the categorization and discussion of
uncertainties surrounding impacts to vegetation and wetland ecosystems for the
Prosperity Gold-Copper Mine Project, these two approaches (categorization and specific
discussion) were never used in the same report. Further, although uncertainty was
discussed in a separate section of the Aquarius Gold Mine EIS, the nature of the
uncertainty was never fully explained. Arguably, these two approaches (categorization
and specific discussion) are complimentary and together would provide more useful and
comprehensive information to stakeholders and decision makers. Expressing or
quantifying levels of confidence is an effective means to communicate that uncertainty
exists; however, where it does exist it requires further explanation or description in terms
of the nature of the uncertainty, the implications for the project or decision making, and
the means to address it (Duncan 2008; Geneletti et al. 2003; Tennøy, Kværner, and
Gjerstad 2006; Walker et al. 2003; Wardekker et al. 2008).
Uncertainties were often reported in the proponent’s EIS to be addressed using follow-
up programs or adaptive management; however, it was unclear in most cases whether and
how these programs directly addressed the uncertainties that were disclosed. The programs






























were never discussed in depth and, as such, we were unable to assess whether the
uncertainties disclosed in the EISs were indeed addressed through proposed follow-up or
adaptive management programs. Overall, the number of cases where uncertainties
identified in the EIS were not addressed by follow-up, or by any other means, was higher
than the number of cases where uncertainties were addressed. The proponent’s EIS
typically relied on the anticipated success of mitigation measures, on contingency plans,
and on follow-up programs that were never discussed in depth with regard to uncertainties
 an approach characterized by Tinker et al. (2005) as ‘paper promises’.
Impacts that were uncertain were rarely rated as significant; when they were rated as
significant the uncertainty was not addressed. It is unclear whether uncertainty was
intentionally hidden in the proponent’s EIS (see Wood 2008), or whether proponents or
practitioners thought it was too difficult or not necessary to disclose uncertainties. It may
be, according to Duncan (2008), that proponents simply have a vested interest in making
their EISs appear defensible and politically palatable, resulting in practices that
systematically seek to minimize uncertainty disclosure. Until there are specific
requirements for uncertainty disclosure, and established standards for how to do so and for
the nature and level of information required in an EIS, practice will continue to be mixed.
Our findings are consistent with findings of researchers from other nations (e.g., De
Jongh 1988; Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad 2006; Duncan 2008), indicating that the
information communicated in EA regarding uncertainty is often simplified and
incomplete. This study also confirms previous evidence from Sweden in that the
effectiveness of mitigation measures, contingency plans, and follow-up programs are
presented more confidently than they should be (Wiklund 2011). Moreover, the lack of
in-depth consideration of uncertainty can be likened to Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad
(2006)’s black box, illustrating the lack of transparency and accountability toward the
public and regulatory decision makers. In the EAs we examined, even though
uncertainties were never discussed in depth, they were somehow acknowledged in the
reports, albeit implicitly, which confirmed the unavoidable presence of uncertainties in
EA as described in studies conducted in the Netherlands (Arts, Caldwell, and Morrison-
Saunders 2001; Walker et al. 2003), Northern Italy (Geneletti et al. 2003), and the USA
(Canter 1996). However, given that uncertainties were not disclosed consistently and not
addressed thoroughly, our research confirms that how and where to address uncertainty
information remains a challenging task in EA.
4.3. Implications for regulatory decision makers
Our results suggest that although in some cases uncertainties are disclosed, there is
insufficient information made available for those responsible for project approvals to
adequately assess and understand the implications of uncertainty, and whether and how it
should affect project approvals or licensing conditions. Decision makers, as informed
readers of EAs, are sometimes made aware that uncertainty exists, but they are rarely
presented with detailed information as to the nature and potential implications of the
uncertainty. In review panel reports, for example, attention often focuses on uncertainty
as a general concept and with broad-brush recommendations to address uncertainty, but
with limited guidance or information for decision makers as to what specific conditions
or actions are necessary to manage uncertainty, and the implications for the viability or
acceptability of the project.
Our results confirm previous reviews of EA uncertainty, concluding that decision
makers are not made fully aware of uncertainties in EA (Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad






























2006). That said, Duncan (2008) suggests that even when decision makers are made
aware of uncertainties they may choose not to disclose them further or address them. In
our study, aside from information requests submitted during the EA process, we found no
indication that decision makers requested additional information about the uncertainties
found in the EIS, specifically their sources and implications, especially when information
communicated was vague and incomplete. Such information would allow decision
makers to make more informed decisions (Geneletti et al. 2003) and promote prudent
strategies (Reckhow 1994) and ensure better EA overall (Duncan 2008; Tennøy,
Kværner, and Gjerstad 2006; Ragas et al. 2009).
5. Conclusions
Very few studies have investigated how uncertainties are actually considered and
disclosed in EA practice, despite EA having a more than 40-year history, and our study
addresses this urgent need. This paper examined the ways in which EAs address
uncertainties, particularly in the proponent’s EPPs and follow-up programs, and in the
reports of review panels, to identify current trends and good and poor practices. Our
results indicate that EAs need to better reflect the complexity of environmental processes,
the incompleteness of knowledge and the uncertainty of making predictions about the
future impacts of a project than what is currently practiced. Consistent with Budescu,
Por, and Broomell (2012) and Leung et al. (2015), there is a need for uncertainty
information to be documented in a way that can be easily and effectively transmitted to
decision makers, the public, and other stakeholders  but also in a way that facilitates
depth in understanding of the implications of uncertainty and how it will be addressed
through EPPs, follow-up programs, and panel reports. In our study, when uncertainty was
disclosed there was limited, and often superficial, discussion of the implications of the
uncertainties. Based on our sample of EAs, there appears to be overconfidence in EPPs
and follow-up programs in Canadian EA  an observation consistent with EA
evaluations in Norway (Tennøy, Kværner, and Gjerstad 2006), Australia (Duncan 2008),
and Sweden (Wiklund 2011).
It was challenging to gather and assess uncertainty disclosure based on EA
documentation, largely because uncertainty information was typically qualitative, implicit,
and variably reported using diverse terminology. There was no consistent terminology
used in the same EA to communicate uncertainty  a problem that also persists in the
scientific community (Walker et al. 2003). Some useful approaches were identified in the
EAs, including the use of conservative estimates, sensitivity analysis, and precautionary
approaches. However, there is a need for improved guidance and reporting standards to
assess and address uncertainties in EA practice (Wood 2008), so as to “enhance
transparency and improve handling of uncertainties” in EA (Karlson, M€ortberg, and
Balfors 2014, 17). For example, the use of separate sections or tables to disclose
uncertainties is helpful and appropriate, but uncertainties also need to be discussed in
depth and more explicitly addressed, for each step of the EA. Table 8 provides some
preliminary guidance in this regard, based on the observations emerging from our results.
We acknowledge the limitations to our study, in terms of the sample size and, in
particular, the unavailability of complete EA documentation. Federal agencies are not
legally obligated to keep the entire EIS available after disclosing them to the public at the
time of the EA process, and documentation was difficult to obtain (see Ball, Noble, and
Dube 2013). The EA procedure is also a continuing process that involves an ongoing
exchange of documents, suggestions, comments, and questions between the proponent,






























stakeholders, and regulators. We acknowledge that our review of EA documentation may
not have been comprehensive of all information, as we could only access that which was
made available via government websites for disseminating project information, via the
proponent’s website for public communications, or by requests made to government or
proponent representatives. To better understand how uncertainty is considered in EA
practice, and the influence on project approvals and licensing conditions, we recommend
additional research that focuses also on exploratory interviews with practitioners,
proponents, and decision makers.
Table 8. Preliminary guidelines on how uncertainty disclosure can be improved at each step of
EA, based on the results from the document analysis of 12 comprehensive study and review panel
EAs.
Steps of EIA Recommendations for improved uncertainty disclosure
Screening Uncertainty documentation and disclosure guidelines are communicated to
the proponents and consultants of the project.
Standard uncertainty typology and terminology is established for use in EIA
reporting.
There is an opportunity for the public to identify any perceived uncertainties
related to the project early in the process, before EIS terms of reference are
established.
Scoping Uncertainty documentation and disclosure are required in EIS terms of
reference.
Uncertainties are identified and communicated early in the EIA process, when
considering alternatives to proposed projects, developing baseline data,





Uncertainties are identified and explained in a dedicated section of the EIS for
each environmental component or predicted impact, for residual and
cumulative impacts, mitigation measures, contingency plans, and follow-
up programs.
Consultants define and disclose the approaches taken to address uncertainties
that cannot be reduced (e.g., data uncertainty). The parties responsible for
addressing uncertainties in applied mitigation measures, contingency
plans, and follow-up programs post project-implementation are identified.
Uncertainty is a criterion used in significance determination.
Consultants distinguish between the uncertainty in the prediction of effects
and the uncertainty in the assessment of the importance of the associated
impacts.
Review and decision Transparency of uncertainty in the EIS and measures identified to address
uncertainty are factors considered in the approval, or conditions for
approval, of the EIS.
Decision makers (or responsible authorities) communicate in their review and




Monitoring, auditing, and adaptive management plans for projects are
publicly available so that consultants are able to use that information for
future EISs.
Monitoring, auditing, and follow-up reports document the experiences and
lessons learned from the project regarding how to address uncertainties
(e.g., inaccurate predictions, miscalculations, data gaps,
misinterpretations) and are available for the improvement of future
projects.































We wish to acknowledge the support of several government agency staff members for assisting with
EIS acquisition, and Jean-Philippe Waaub and two reviewers for their helpful comments to an
earlier version of this manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada: Insight Grant Program [Grant
Number 435-2012-0024].
References
AGRA Earth and Environmental Limited. 1999. Comprehensive Study Report: Environmental
Assessment Aquarius Project. AGRA Earth and Environmental Limited. Mississauga, Ontario,
Canada; submitted to Echo Bay Mines Ltd., Timmins, Ontario.
Arts, J., P. Caldwell, and A. Morrison-Saunders. 2001. “Environmental Impact Assessment Follow-
up: Good Practice and Future Directions  Findings from a Workshop at the IAIA 2000
Conference.” Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 19 (3): 175185.
Ashford, N., K. Barrett, A. Bernstein, R. Costanza, P. Costner, C. Cranor, P. deFur et al. 1998.
Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle. Wingspread Statement. http://www.
sehn.org/wing.html
Ball, M., B.F. Noble, and M. Dube. 2013. “Valued Ecosystem Components for Watershed
Cumulative Effects: An Analysis of Environmental Impact Assessments in the South
Saskatchewan Watershed, Canada.” Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management
9 (3): 469479.
Benetto, E., C. Dujet, and P. Rousseaux. 2006. “Fuzzy-sets Approach to Noise Impact Assessment.”
The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 11 (4): 222228.
Berg, M., and M. Scheringer. 1994. “Problems in Environmental Risk Assessment and the Need for
Proxy Measures.” Fresenius Environmental Bulletin 3 (8): 487492.
Bond, A., J. Pope, A. Morrison-Saunders, F. Retief, and J.A.E. Gunn. 2014. “Impact Assessment:
Eroding Benefits Through Streamlining?” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 45:
4653.
Bond, A., A. Morrison-Saunders, J.A.E. Gunn, J. Pope, and F. Retief. 2015. “Managing
Uncertainty, Ambiguity and Ignorance in Impact Assessment by Embedding Evolutionary
Resilience, Participatory Modelling and Adaptive Management.” Journal of Environmental
Management 151: 97104. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.12.030.
Budescu, D.V., H. Por, and S.B. Broomell. 2012. “Effective Communication of Uncertainty in the
IPCC Reports.” Climate Change 113 (2): 181200.
Burris, R.K., and L.W. Canter. 1997. “Cumulative Impacts Are Not Properly Addressed in
Environmental Assessment.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 17: 518.
Canter, L.W. 1996. “Scientific Uncertainty and the Environmental Impact Assessment Process
in the United States.” In Scientific Uncertainty and Environmental Problem Solving, edited by
J. Lemons, 298326. Cambridge: Blackwell Science.
CEAA (Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency). 2011. 407 East Transportation Corridor 
Comprehensive Study Report. Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.
Committee on Decision Making Under Uncertainty. 2013. Environmental Decisions in the Face of
Uncertainty. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Deer Creek Energy Limited. 2006. The Joslyn North Mine Project-Section B Project Description
and Section D Environmental Assessment. https://exts2.aep.alberta.ca/DocArc/EIA/EIA/2005-
03-DeerCreekEnergyLtdSAGDProjectPhaseIIIA.aspx
De Jongh, P. 1988. “Uncertainty in EIA.” In Environmental Impact Assessment: Theory and
Practice, edited by P. Wathern, 6284. London: Routledge.






























Duncan, R. 2008. “Problematic Practice in Integrated Impact Assessment: The Role of Consultants
and Predictive Computer Models in Burying Uncertainty.” Impact Assessment Project
Appraisal 26 (1): 5366.
Duncan, R. 2013. “Opening New Institutional Spaces for Grappling with Uncertainty: A
Constructivist Perspective.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 38: 151154.
EnCana Energy Corporation. 2002. Deep Panuke Offshore Gas Development  Comprehensive
Study Report. http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/68D50708-docs/report_e.pdf
EnCana Energy Corporation. 2006. Deep Panuke Offshore Gas Development Plan-EIS. Volume 4
Environmental Assessment Report. http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/pdfs/1.pdf
Findlay, C.S., and J. Bourdages. 2000. “Response Time of Wetland Biodiversity to Road
Construction on Adjacent Lands.” Conservation Biology 14 (1): 8694.
Geneletti, D., E. Beinat, C.J.F. Chung, A.G. Fabbri, and H.J. Scholten. 2003. “Accounting for
Uncertainty Factors in Biodiversity Impact Assessment: Lessons from a Case Study.”
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 23 (4): 471487.
Gibson, R. 2012. “In Full Retreat: The Canadian Government’s New Environmental Assessment
Law Undoes Decades of Progress.” Impact Assessment Project Appraisal 30 (3): 179188.
Golder Associates. 2000. Environmental Impact Assessment for the Swan Valley Gasification
Project.
Golder Associates. 2003. Application for Environmental Assessment Certificate and Draft
Comprehensive Study Report for the City of Prince George Island Collector Well. http://a100.
gov.bc.ca/appsdata/epic/html/deploy/epic_document_209_15598.html
Government of Canada. 2001. A Canadian Perspective on the Precautionary Approach/Principle.
http://www.cambridgeforums.com/ww.admin/materials/env/1389302564A_Canadian_Perspec
tive_on_the_Precautionary_Principle_Approach_EC.pdf
Imperial Oil Resources Ventures Limited, ConocoPhillips Canada (North) Limited, Shell Canada
Limited, ExxonMobil Canada Properties and Aboriginal Pipeline Group. 2004. Environmental
Impact Statement for the Mackenzie Gas Project. http://www.mackenziegasproject.com/thePro
ject/regulatoryProcess/applicationSubmission/Applicationscope/EIS.html
INRS (Institut national de la recherche scientifique). 1998. The Crees of The Waskaganish First
Nation. Waskaganish Permanent Road Environmental and Social Impact Study Volume I 
Impact Analysis. Quebec: Universite du Quebec, Culture et Societe.
Iris Environmental Systems. 1999. A Proposal to Develop a Chairlift and Ski Runs on Eagle Ridge
Marmot Basin Ski Area, Jasper National Park. Prepared for the Ski Marmot Basin, Jasper
National Park, Alberta, by IRIS Environmental Systems, Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
Jacques Whitford Environment Limited. 2004. Environmental Impact Statement Liquefied Natural
Gas Marine Terminal and Multi-Purpose Pier. Prepared for Irving Oil Limited. http://www.
ceaa-acee.gc.ca/6AC3B6B1-docs/report_e.pdf
Jaeger, J. 1998. “Exposition und Konfiguration als Bewertungsebenen f€ur Umweltgef€ahrdungen
[On the Use of Exposition and Configuration as Stages for Assessing Environmental Threats].”
Zeitschrift f€ur angewandte Umweltforschug (ZAU) 11 (3/4): 444466.
Joint Review Panel appointed to review the environmental impacts of the proposed Mackenzie Gas
Project. 2009. Foundation for a Sustainable Northern Future; Report of the Joint Review Panel
for the Mackenzie Gas Project. http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?langDEn&nD155701CE-1
Karlson, M., U. M€ortberg, and B. Balfors. 2014. “Road Ecology in Environmental Impact
Assessment.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 48: 1019.
Krippendorff, K. 2004. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. Pennsylvania: Sage.
Larsen, S.V., L. Kørnøv, and P. Driscoll. 2013. “Avoiding Climate Change Uncertainties in
Strategic Environmental Assessment.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 43: 144150.
Leung, W., B. Noble, J.A.E. Gunn, and J.A.G. Jaeger. 2015. “A Review of Uncertainty Research in
Impact Assessment.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 50: 116123.
Ministry of Transportation. 2009. 407 East Individual Environmental Assessment and Preliminary
Design Study. Ottawa: Ministry of Transportation of Ontario.
Nalcor Energy. 2011. Lower Churchill Hydroelectric Generation Project  Report of the Joint
Review Panel. http://www.env.gov.nl.ca/env/env_assessment/projects/Y2010/1305/lower_churchill_
panel_report.pdf
Nalcor Energy. 2013. Lower Churchill Project-Project Wide Environmental Protection Plan
Component 1 and 4b. http://www.env.gov.nl.ca/env/env_assessment/projects/Y2010/1305/proj
ect_wide_epp_rev.pdf






























Noble, B. 2015. Introduction to Environmental Impact Assessment: A Guide to Principles and
Practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Noble, B., and K. Storey. 2005. “Towards Increasing the Utility of Follow-Up in Canadian EIA.”
Environmental Impact Assessment Review 25 (2): 163180.
Peche, R., and E. Rodriguez. 2011. “Environmental Impact Assessment by Means of a Procedure
Based on Fuzzy Logic: A Practical Application.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 31
(2): 8796.
Petersen, A.C., A. Cath, M. Hage, E. Kunseler, and J.P. Van der Sluijs. 2011. “Post-normal Science
in Practice at the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.” Science Technology and
Human Values 36 (3): 362388.
Ragas, A.M.J., M.A.J. Huijbregts, I. Henning-De Jong, and R.S. Leuven. 2009. “Uncertainty in
Environmental Risk Assessment: Implications for Risk-Based Management of River Basins.”
Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 5 (1): 2737.
Reckhow, K.H. 1994. “Importance of Scientific Uncertainty in Decision-making.” Environmental
Management 18 (2): 161166.
Ross, T.J., J.M. Booker, and A.C. Montoya. 2013. “New Developments in Uncertainty Assessment
and Uncertainty Management.” Expert Systems with Applications 40 (3): 964974.
S€oderman, T. 2005. “Treatment of Biodiversity Issues in Finnish Environmental Impact
Assessment.” Impact Assessment Project Appraisal 23 (2): 8799.
Smith, H. 1975. Strategies of Social Research: The Methodological Imagination. London: Prentice
Hall International.
Taseko Mines Limited. 2009. Prosperity Gold-Copper Project Environmental Impact Statement/
Application. http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/document-70eng.cfm?documentD32276
Taseko Mines Limited. 2010. Prosperity Gold-Copper Mine Project  Report of the Federal
Review Panel. http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/documents/46911/46911E.pdf
Tennøy, A., J. Kværner, and K.I. Gjerstad. 2006. “Uncertainty in Environmental Impact Assessment
Predictions: The Need for Better Communication and More Transparency.” Impact Assessment
Project Appraisal 24 (1): 4556.
Tinker, L., D. Cobb, A. Bond, and M. Cashmore. 2005. “Impact Mitigation in Environmental
Impact Assessment: Paper Promises or the Basis of Consent Conditions?” Impact Assessment
and Project Appraisal 23 (4): 265280.
Total E&P Joslyn Limited. 2011. Joslyn North Mine Project  Report of the Joint Review Panel.
https://external.sp.environment.gov.ab.ca/DocArc/EIA/Pages/default.aspx
Walker, W.E., P. Harremo€es, J. Rotmans, J.P. van der Sluijs, M.B.A. van Asselt, P. Janssen, and
M.P. Krayer von Krauss. 2003. “Defining Uncertainty: A Conceptual Basis for Uncertainty
Management in Model-Based Decision Support.” Integrated Assessment 4 (1): 517.
Wardekker, J.A., J.P. van der Sluijs, P.H.M. Janssen, P. Kloprogge, and A.C. Petersen. 2008.
“Uncertainty Communication in Environmental Assessments: Views from the Dutch Science-
policy Interface.” Environmental Science and Policy 11 (7): 627641.
Wiklund, H. 2011. “Why High Participatory Ideals Fail in Practice: A Bottom-Up Approach to
Public Nonparticipation in EIA.” Environmental Assessment Policy and Management 13 (2):
159178.
Wood, C., B. Dipper, and C. Jones. 2000. “Auditing the Assessment of the Environmental Impacts
of Planning Projects.” Environmental Planning and Management 43 (1): 2347.
Wood, G. 2008. “Thresholds and Criteria for Evaluating and Communicating Impact Significance in
Environmental Statements: ‘See no Evil, Hear no Evil, Speak no Evil’?” Environmental Impact
Assessment Review 28 (1): 2238.
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 21
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
on
co
rd
ia 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Li
br
ari
es
] a
t 0
8:3
1 1
0 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
